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Introduction and General Overview   
 As the Year of the Dragon unfolds, Chinese companies continue to nurture their 
ambitious plans to expand into Europe supported by the Chinese government (Anderlini, 2011). 
These modern conquerors can contribute to reshape global trade and investment flows in the 
coming years (Miller, 2011), which has caused controversial reactions in the European Union 
(EU) (Voss & Clegg, 2011). 
 On the one hand, as Chinese banks and investment funds are state-controlled, concerns 
have been raised about the real motives underlying their investment. In fact, what today seems to 
be a commercially motivated investment strategy might be leveraged in the future to pursue 
political goals. Moreover, the EU does not have a central investment review system similar to 
those of other developed countries such as USA, Australia, or Japan, which can prevent it from 
losing its industrial capabilities and preserve its technological leadership. In other words, the EU, 
as a whole, has a lower sensitivity and control over national-security issues than USA and other 
Western developed economies (Miller, 2011). However, potential and actual local conflicts with 
the national interest of host countries represent concrete barriers to Chinese expansion (Shi, 
Milelli, & Hay, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, in recent years, Europe has started to welcome Chinese investors just 
as much as other foreign ones, especially those contributing to the development of greenfield 
projects (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012).  In fact, the Chinese have revived distressed companies (e.g. 
Volvo, world recognized car manufacturer, in 2010) through acquisition or equity participation, 
and continue to invest in others severely hit by the economic crisis (e.g. the Italian Ferretti Yacht 
at the end of 2011) therefore saving jobs, and indirectly helping creditors and suppliers. They 
also signed partnership agreements with local counterparts in the scientific and technology 
research fields - e.g. the agreement between the China Italy Technology Transfer Center and the 
Beijing Technology Transfer Commission to jointly develop science-focused theme parks 
(Virtuani, 2012). Furthermore, European Promotion Investment Agencies established a presence 
in China with the goal of attracting further investment from Chinese firms (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 
2012). 
 
World Foreign Direct Investment in the Early 2000’s: Drivers and Evolution 
 This twofold scenario acquires even more relevance from a macroeconomic perspective 
while the global financial crisis continues to evolve. In particular, the flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is a key indicator that offers an overall framework to understand a complex and 
evolving situation. In this regard, the large systematic picture is defined by the World Investment 
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Report 2011, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  
 Historically, foreign direct investment global flows follow closely the world’s economic 
cycles and are driven by the following factors (Sonzogni, 2007): 
• Uncertainty level related to the velocity of economic growth 
• Companies’ capacity to finance their operations with profits and loans 
• Easiness for companies to have access to external sources of financing 
• Attractiveness of debt versus predicted return on investment 
 
 Due to the effect of these factors, the beginning of the new Millennium was characterized 
by the apex of a strong wave of FDI started in 1993. In just seven years, the significant 
technological development, the international trend of deregulation and privatization of public 
organizations, and global flows grew four-fold reaching a record level of $1.3 trillion in 2000 
(UNCTAD, 2011).   
 
 
 
     
 
          Figure 1 – FDI flows and rate of growth (1993-2010). Source: World Investment Report 2011 (Unctad) 
 
 
 Additional accelerating factors, such as China’s entry into WTO, India’s growing 
integration in the world economy, the admission of ten Eastern European countries to the EU 
contributed to the unprecedented creation of new opportunities to delocalize not only production 
plants, but also services and other activities. Moreover, fewer barriers to international trade both 
on a global and regional scale, a general cut of bureaucracy for foreign investment, and a 
reduction of public monopolies gave further boost to FDI. 
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 From a microeconomics perspective, continuous innovation, internationalization of 
supply chains, and increasing fragmentation of product development and production, along with 
more uniform life styles, customers’ preferences and demand, played an important role.  
 Conversely, some negative events such as the outburst of the new economy’s financial 
bubble and the 9/11 terrorist attack counterposed the growth of FDI, and provoked a “wait and 
see” sentiment among investors. In fact, FDI’s trend dramatically changed in 2001 following the 
global slowdown of the economy and the considerable drop of stocks’ value on financial 
markets. Consequently, in the following two years FDI fell to $600 billion down to 1998’s level 
(UNCTAD, 2011).  
 
 Coming after a stable 2004, the year 2005 represents an important turning point for FDI’s 
flows trend. They dramatically grew for 3 consecutive years, fueled by the euphoric economic 
development all around the world, especially in countries such as China, India, and Brazil, 
reaching an historical peak of $1.9 trillion in 2007. The low interest rates, excess liquidity, 
stock’s value rise, and an extremely optimistic sentiment of market’s players was the ideal mix 
of underlying positive conditions to create a favorable environment for companies’ growth, 
especially through M&A. The acquisition of IBM’s pc division and the Italian 
telecommunication provider Wind, respectively by Lenovo for $1.8 billion and the Egyptian 
investment fund Weather Investment for $12.8 billion, were two clear example of this euphoric 
climate. 
 
 During the biennium 2008-2009, the consequences of the outburst of the real estate and 
the sub-prime bubbles were devastating for FDI flows. Sovereign debt issues, plunging profit, 
and credit crunch caused and accompanied a rapid 42% decrease to $1.1 trillion, sweeping away 
almost all the progress made since 2005.  
 
 Even though world trade and industrial production returned to their pre-crisis levels, FDI 
flows in 2010 remained about 15% below their pre-crisis average, and 37% below their 2007 
peak. In fact, stimulus packages’ and other public fiscal policies’ support to the economy has not 
yet been replaced by private investment that is necessary to achieve a sustainable economic 
recovery. The root cause of this trend is that transnational corporations (TNC), usually leaders 
among private investors, maintained cautious investment plans due to the volatility of the 
business environment and the risk of a widespread sovereign debt crisis, especially in developed 
countries.  
 
 As for the future, UNCTAD maintains a relatively optimistic outlook, and “predicts FDI 
flows will continue their recovery to reach $1.4 –1.6 trillion, or the pre-crisis level, in 2011” 
(UNCTAD, 2011). This prediction is supported by the return of a widespread moderate 
confidence due to several factors which range from the ongoing stabilization of the financial 
system accompanied by stimulus package programs implemented by countries hit by the crisis to 
the resilient growth of emerging economies. However, it is also possible for FDI flows to 
stagnate due to the unpredictability of global economic governance, worsening sovereign debt 
crisis, and fiscal and financial imbalances (UNCTAD, 2011). 
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Chinese investment: the Macro Trend Remain Positive Despite the Crisis  
 Chinese’s gradual opening to foreign presence and expansion begun during the early ’80s 
and remained low until the end of the last century both in terms of acquisitions and FDI 
outflows. 
 From the early 2000s Chinese FDI was boosted due to the global expansion policy 
introduced by the government under the name zou-chu-qu, that translated literally means “going 
out”, which removed unnecessary controls on foreign exchange reserves and simplified 
administrative procedures. 
 Similarly, the considerable increase in Chinese ventures in Europe that opened the new 
Millennium represented a new wave of investment from Asia after South Korean in the 1990s 
and the more relevant Japanese investment in the 1980s. This trend continued both in EU and in 
the rest of the world in the following years, with the exception of 2006, supported by the positive 
economic climate in early years and not excessively penalized by the worst economic crisis of 
the last eighty years later. In particular, the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 allowed Chinese 
firms to invest in new, low-cost countries and leverage their position to acquire easier access to 
the rest of the Euro area. Although less than 3% of China’s global investment stock was located 
in the EU in 2009 (taking into account ventures made through the Luxembourg hub) the 12 new 
EU countries attracted over 10% of the EU’s total. “This is a greater proportion than their share 
of EU GDP, and suggests that Chinese investment decisions are driven primarily by growth” 
(Voss & Clegg, 2011). 
 As Chinese outward FDI flows augmented by 132% in 2008 and 6.5% in 2009 
(UNCTAD, 2011) due to the intervention of the government with a stimulus plan and political 
support, Chinese investment in Europe increased as well - especially in the agriculture, raw 
materials, and energy sectors (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012).  However, the amount of transactions 
was lower than previous periods due to limited access to financial resources (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 
2012) and Chinese companies were controlling 118 European businesses in 2011 (Miller, 2011).  
 
Importance of the Topic; Questions and issues to be addressed 
 Although the impact of Chinese companies’ investment in Europe has been limited so far 
because of their relatively small scale and share of total investment in EU, this topic is extremely 
important and relevant from its future evolution perspective (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). In fact, 
Chinese investment may benefit EU countries and European firms in many ways such as: 
• Wider and privileged access to the Chinese and other emerging markets  
• Opportunities to sell distressed assets and still make a profit  
• Higher returns of R&D investment due to the premium price paid by Chinese firms to 
acquire technologies, patents, and know-how 
• Opportunities to revive companies on the verge of bankruptcy  
• Funds for EU banks 
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 Having this framework in mind, it is still unclear how the Chinese investment pattern will 
continue in the future, and how Chinese companies should approach their expansion in EU, 
reducing failures and not appearing as modern invaders, but strategic partners. At the same time 
there is a debate on how EU authorities should plan potential developments of Chinese presence 
in EU.  
Literature review 
 The literature about this topic is relatively limited in terms of number of papers and data 
publicly available. However, there is a broad coverage of subjects that highlights fundamental 
aspects: characteristics, motives, modes of entry, strategies, and implications of Chinese 
investments both for EU and China.   
 I focused my research on the more recent period starting with the year 2000. 
Characteristics: Recent Geographical and Industries’ Distribution 
 From a geographical standpoint, “over the last decade there is little evidence of a 
continuous and focused investment strategy in particular countries” (Voss & Clegg, 2011). 
Nevertheless, Chinese investments are mainly focused in Western European countries such as 
the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Italy, to manufacture and sell product on the 
spot, and take advantage of developed infrastructures. The size of the market also matters and 
acquired even more importance during the recent crisis: UK, France, and Germany account for 
60% of total Chinese investments since 2008 (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010), followed by Italy, 
Netherland, and Spain (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012).   
 According to the British Trade & Investment’s UK Inward Investment 2007/2008 report, 
Chinese companies consider UK as their first choice location for a variety of reasons: London’s 
position as a prominent financial center, simple and transparent bureaucracy, diversity, and 
market efficiency, among others. Moreover, the UK Trade & Investment network managed by 
the government, also supported within the UK by regional investment promotion agencies, help 
UK companies to network with Chinese firms in their home country (Voss & Clegg, 2011). 
Therefore UK leads the ranking of top destination countries with 30% of total Chinese 
investments (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010).  
 As for the second group of countries in the ranking, Chinese firms are playing an 
increasingly relevant role in the home appliances industry in Italy, where they initially opted for 
gradually entering the market as subcontractors (Rossi & Burghart, 2009).  
 Interest in Central Europe (Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Czech Republic), expressed 
by Chinese investors in 2007, slightly faded during the crisis (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). 
However, some investments were made leveraging reciprocal political and diplomatic 
relationships. 
 From an industrial distribution standpoint, Chinese investments target a wide range of 
sectors. While three of them (equipment, logistics, and telecommunications) are the top targeted 
sectors by Chinese investors (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010), Chinese companies’ investments are 
shifting towards services to increase control over sales and value chain (Rossi & Burghart, 
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2009). However, the number of industries covered by Chinese companies increased during the 
crisis (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010), and include among the most relevant: textile, automotive, 
finance, metals and other materials, and pharmaceutical (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). The 
increasing footprint in the textile sector is a direct consequence of consumer demand for luxury 
brands in China (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). As for the automotive sector, the acquisition of 
Volvo by Geely from Ford along with the interest of BAIC of taking over the German car 
manufacturer Opel, owned by GM, are the  clearest examples of the Chinese intention to become 
a primary player in this industry. Moreover, Hotyork Investment Group is acquiring a majority 
stake in the Italian luxury car brand De Tomaso this year1 and Geely will begin to sell its car 
online in the Italian market from April 20122. It is also worth noticing that investments in 
renewable energy, virtually non-existent before the crisis, are acquiring more relevance since 
2008 and represent 11% of Chinese investments in Europe (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010).  
Motives 
 By and large, motives can be explored considering two categories of Chinese investors: 
large state-owned firms with access to government funds and private companies. While the 
former’s investment goal is to diversify their portfolios of real assets, the latter is upgrading their 
industrial capabilities and developing their business in accordance with their corporate industrial 
strategy. However, private companies privilege the fast growing Chinese market growth more 
than European ones which are growing at a slower pace, stagnating, or even experiencing a 
recession.  
 Several other motives drive Chinese investors. First of all, there is no expansion attitude 
per se because Chinese companies have long term goals and a long time horizon to achieve a 
positive return on their investments, and are not too concerned about short term results (Hay, 
Milelli, & Shi, 2012). In this regard, the financial and political support of the Chinese 
government plays a crucial role. Moreover, the attitude not to radically change the structure of 
acquired companies and the soft approach - which both aim to maintain stability - takes 
precedence over every other consideration (Cogman & Tan, 2010). 
 Secondly, there is a broad consensus about the resource-seeking characteristic of Chinese 
investments. In other words, acquisition of assets, know-how, managerial expertise, brands, and 
technology are the key drivers of Chinese investments.  
 
 However, sometimes partners or targets are selected more for their consolidated 
distribution network rather than for their technology. In fact, developing business relationships 
with primary market players gives easy access to the profitable EU market (Nicolas & Thomsen, 
2008) and segment with a high growth rate (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010).  
 
 Chinese companies are also motivated by the potential transfer of acquired skills to create 
a sustainable competitive advantage in their domestic market (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010). 
                                                      
1 http://motori.corriere.it/motori/attualita/12_febbraio_14/detomaso-venduta-cinesi_95b7ddd0-5729-11e1-a6d2-
3f65acf5f759.shtml 
2http://motori.corriere.it/motori/attualita/11_dicembre_23/Geely-sbarco-italia_4e21c88c-2d49-11e1-8aef-
f6cc58616bde.shtml 
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Modes of Entry 
 At the beginning of the century, Chinese companies started to invest in the European raw 
materials industry and established their first R&D centers in Scandinavia, Benelux, Spain, and 
central European countries (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010). 
 Greenfield investment has been the elective choice in the telecommunication and service 
industry (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). For instance, China Telecom established a subsidiary in 
Europe in 2006 and CCTV opened its European headquarters in UK in 2008. Many R&D centers 
have been launched to adapt Chinese products to local markets or acquire host countries’ know-
how in terms of technologies and managerial skills (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008).  
 Unlike direct investors from other emerging markets, the most common mode of entry for 
Chinese companies remains the joint venture (JV) followed later by a more consistent 
investment. 
 Chinese driven cross-border M&A, especially of small scale, are becoming more 
common in EU, particularly as a consequence of the global crisis. However, hostile takeovers by 
Chinese firms are still extremely rare nowadays because European sellers have the opportunity to 
dismiss under-performing assets (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008) with a collaborative negotiation 
approach, avoiding long and expensive struggles. Chinese companies are also often the only 
alternative on the EU market due to the stagnating European economy, a serious obstacle to this 
type of transactions. Furthermore, Chinese tend to avoid acquisitions of emblematic or large-
sized companies that would results in protectionist measures or even potential xenophobic 
reactions against foreigner investors (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010).  
Strategies 
 In EU, three major types of strategies executed by Chinese companies can be identified: 
vertical integration, innovation that leverages internal core competences, and leadership in a 
segment or a niche (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010) especially buying distressed firms, current 
partners’ shares, sub-contractor, or suppliers (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Chinese companies 
also acquire minority stakes to strengthen their relationship with their European partners 
(Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
 Chinese companies usually aim to create a competitive advantage through cost leadership 
by employing a large number of Chinese workers (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010) who are relocated 
in the host country and are willing to work for a salary lower than the domestic workforce. 
However, relying solely on cost advantage is not a sustainable strategy (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 
2010). 
 Attempts by Chinese companies to differentiate their products have failed so far. In 
particular, they have been unable to overcome their competitors in industries such as 
telecommunication and automotive (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010) in which strict standards, rules, 
and regulations are the minimum requirements needed to succeed.   
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R&D Strategies of Chinese Companies in Europe 
 An interesting sub-category of strategies is the R&D and innovation area of study. 
China’s technological learning style still follows an “imitation” paradigm (Di Minin & Zhang, 
2010). The Chinese government aims to turn Chinese companies into real innovators, but has not 
yet understood which measures should be implemented and how to lead this epochal change (Xie 
& White, 2006). Meanwhile, Chinese companies, that are present in areas of European 
technological excellence, are implementing several different strategies which range from 
technological exploration/exploitation to cooperative/experiential learning (Di Minin & Zhang, 
2010). There is empirical evidence that these firms are insulating themselves from their original 
partners by lowering their engagement in R&D activities, but it is not clear why (Di Minin & 
Zhang, 2010). In fact, according to the microeconomics theory they should increase their level of 
integration in the local innovation systems. If the root cause is that Europe is no longer being 
considered a major innovation area and instead is seen purely as a market to sell products 
designed elsewhere, EU authorities and companies should be concerned. However, some 
Chinese managers disagree with this view (Di Minin & Zhang, 2010). 
 Surprisingly, European legislators and authorities have so far ignored the phenomenon of 
Chinese R&D FDI in Europe (Di Minin & Zhang, 2010), but rising concerns about this issue are 
spreading among policy makers and politicians (Miller, 2011). 
Implications of Chinese investment in Europe 
 Although Chinese investments represent a small share of China’s FDI, there are 
important implications for both sides. 
 From an EU standpoint the main concern at the moment is job preservation. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider the scenario where there was no acquisition by Chinese 
investors. In many cases, the acquired firm was either bankrupt or facing severe financial 
difficulties, and clearly close to going out of business. On the one hand, the overall impact in 
terms of job preservation is relatively modest because Chinese FDI tends to be concentrated in 
sectors which are not labor-intensive (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). On the other hand, when jobs 
were preserved in ailing industries following a takeover by Chinese investors, this positive 
situation did not always last long. Sometimes, the takeover led to a short term recovery of the 
acquired company, but eventually the same weaknesses re-emerged (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
 From a Chinese perspective, investing in EU can fill the gap of China’s poor domestic 
innovation performance and weak technological spillovers from inward investments. In fact, the 
main issue for Chinese companies is not just having access to new technologies, but also to 
benefit and profit from them (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). EU is also a new opportunity to deal 
with domestic overcapacity and saturated market shares (Voss & Clegg, 2011). Furthermore, it 
can also help to relieve the pressure experienced on domestic markets due to greater competition 
that lower profit margins (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010). 
Issues and Failures 
 Many issues arise and several failed post-merger integration occurred from Chinese 
investments in EU. 
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 First, there was often a cultural divide that impeded the development of an effective 
relationship with host country stakeholders, a common corporate culture, and an efficient 
integration of operations (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Often, Chinese companies were 
unprepared to understand EU consumers, regulating authorities, legislators, unions, employees, 
and financial institutions (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Poor knowledge of the local business 
environment and the specifics of the local market caused further difficulties (Schüller & Turner, 
2005). Furthermore, Chinese managers were unfamiliar with strategic risk management. They 
were influenced by cultural aspects when offering products at the cheapest price and based their 
decisions on European stereotypes (Brod, 2009). 
 Chinese management also has a traditional slow, formal, and rigid decision-making 
process because of complex hierarchies and cultural values while the Western managers decide 
more quickly and are subject to less strict supervision.  Moreover, the corporate governance of 
investing firms3 is often weak, not transparent, and dictated by the Chinese government (Nicolas 
& Thomsen, 2008).  
 Due to all the above issues, most ailing companies acquired by Chinese investors could 
not be revived, especially in the electronics sector (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Moreover, 
Chinese companies apparently underestimated the difficulties of turning over firms in declining 
industries (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
 There are also external issues which interfere with an efficient market functioning and 
undermine healthy competition.  
 Chinese companies which receive subsidized funding from the government have an 
unfair competitive advantage over European competitors and, in some sectors, represent a real 
threat to European players. This issue is becoming more relevant as Chinese firms learn how to 
adapt to the European market, meet customers’ expectations, and leverage their European brands 
(Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
 The lack of reciprocity that restricts the possibility to acquire Chinese companies in 
China is also a critical issue because it limits defensive options for European companies.  
 As there is no European review system comparable to those of the US, Australia or 
Japan, national security concerns arise because of the potential leakage of critical European 
technologies to China. In fact, should the private sector in the EU be bought out by Chinese 
companies, “the EU will risk losing its domestically-owned industrial capabilities and 
technological leadership” (Voss & Clegg, 2011).  
 In general, European governments consider China’s political system as distant from 
Western democracies, therefore the growth of influence of Chinese in European companies is a 
highly sensitive issue (Okano-Heijmans & Van Der Putten, 2009). 
                                                      
3 Sovereign wealth funds are widely affected by the lack of transparency  
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Success Stories  
 “Success stories tend to be concentrated in sectors where Chinese firms possess a 
competitive edge (telecommunication equipment), or where the European target is a strong 
leader or a niche producer” (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). The main cause of this pattern is the 
support of the Chinese government to Chinese companies (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Two 
examples of success are BlueStars Silicones and Huwaei Technologies. BlueStars Silicones is a 
firm active in the chemical industry, bought by ChemChina from the French company Rhodia. 
Huwaei Technologies has become the second player in the European mobile equipment market, 
doubling its revenue and surpassing Nokia Siemens. Both companies improved productivity, 
invested in R&D, and positively managed cultural differences (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012).      
Future Development and Effects of the Global Crisis  
 During the National People’s Congress held at the beginning of March 2012, Chinese 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced estimations about economic indicators and changes in 
policies which will influence FDI and, indirectly, investment in EU. He predicted a sharp 
controlled slowdown in GDP growth that is expected to decrease from 9.2% in 2011 to 7.5% in 
2012 while pursuing the goal of 7% in 2015. The goal is to rebalance the national economy, 
making it less driven by exports and more by consumer demand. Therefore, imports and exports 
will drop to 10% in 2012 (they were 24% last year). China would also continue developing high 
technology and green industries abroad. Although past estimations were not reliable, the 
complexity of controlling growth has increased with the integration of China into the global 
economy. Since internal political resistance has delayed economic structural changes in 
economic policies in the past. I consider this shift an important turning point.   
 As for the effects of the global crisis, there are several different opinions and no 
consensus about the future growth of Chinese investments in EU. However, an interesting 
cornerstone is worth mentioning. Although decreased in number (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012), 
Chinese investment projects launched during the crisis are more thoughtful, better planned, and 
more focused both on geographic regions and industries than before (Shi, Milelli, & Hay, 2010).  
 According to Thilo Hanemann, research director at New York consultancy Rhodium 
Group, Chinese companies will invest more than $1 trillion overseas between now and 2020 
looking not just for natural resources, but also mature market making EU a primary target 
(Miller, 2011). Moreover, Chinese managers are becoming more ambitious in pursuing M&A in 
developed EU countries. For example, Mr. Wang, chairman of one of the biggest China’s food 
companies (Bright Food Group), recently said that its firm “needs to buy a top-three European 
food company” (Miller, 2011) and many other Chinese executives have similar goals. However, 
they tend not to disclose their plans and publicly announce potential targets not to inflate prices 
due to takeover expectations.    
 Experts predict M&A to continue increasing in the short and long term. For instance, 
Chen Gang, a food and beverage analyst with Sinolink Securities in Shanghai believe that "there 
aren't that many alternatives to achieve [international growth], other than through acquisition". 
Yufang Guo, a Rotterdam-based consultant has about 100 Chinese clients who are looking to 
buy business operations in Western Europe (Miller, 2011). The Wall Street Journal suggest 
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Chinese investors to look at Cyprus because of its "light manufacturing industry" with "textiles, 
shoes and hats," and Belgium because of its chemical products, logistics and ocean freight 
shipping (Miller, 2011). 
  As already noted, there is a growing presence of Chinese firms in some Eastern 
European transition economies: Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These countries are attractive 
mainly because of growth and wide privatization and liberalization (Hungary), a relatively large 
market (Poland), and a Chinese friendly business environment (Romania). This trend can also 
signal a shift of Chinese investment towards EU countries with a low production cost 
manufacturing product to be exported across richer EU markets (Voss & Clegg, 2011). Another 
explanation might be the opportunity of acquiring experience in low competitive markets (Hay, 
Milelli, & Shi, 2012).   
 Another factor that can support or weaken Chinese growth in Europe is the Treaty of 
Lisbon that established the authority of one commissioner over FDI in EU and investment 
liberalization (Voss & Clegg, 2011).  
Analysis 
Methodology and Source of Information 
 First of all, I have adopted a microeconomics perspective because macroeconomics 
statistics about FDI flows and stocks are biased by intra-firm investment, and circular flows 
between China and Hong Kong through intermediate detours, often made via tax havens such as 
Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands (Hay, Milelli, & Shi, 2012). There are also evident 
discrepancies between inflows and outflows data (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 I have also discarded non equity modes of international production and development 
(NEM), a middle ground between trade and FDI, because they are not covered by any national or 
international statistics (UNCTAD, 2011). Therefore the sources of information that I used to 
perform my analysis are scholar’s journal articles, academic books, and respected online sources 
listed in the bibliography. 
 Due to the scarcity of data, and no direct access to other parties’ proprietary database, I 
decided to follow a qualitative approach and take a strategic perspective. In particular, I utilized 
concepts and frameworks of the negotiation and conflict management theory (Lewicki, Saunders, 
& Barry, 2010) - combined with the integration-local responsiveness (IR) model (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1987). As the latter helps to identify which industries are the most suitable for Chinese 
integration in the global competitive arena, the previous serve to define the best approach to 
successfully deal with the European counterparts and vice versa. The result is a four step model 
that I named with the acronym L.I.S.A.: 
1. List of industries 
2. IR model’s application (China only) 
3. Selection of Negotiation Strategy 
4. Adjustment of Negotiation Strategy 
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The L.I.S.A. Model: Description of Steps and Implementation 
 I used the IR model that defines four internationalization strategies which are determined 
by the relative low/high level of pressure for local responsiveness and global integration. The 
description and key characteristics of the four strategies are listed in the table below (Fan, 
Nyland, & Zhu, 2009).  
      Table 1 – IR model’s strategies: description and key characteristics.  
STRATEGY 
LOCAL 
RESPONSIVNESS/ 
GLOBAL 
INTEGRATION 
DESCRIPTION 
Global Low/High Offer of global standardized products in the world, 
considered as a single market place. 
Transnational High/High Combination of local responsiveness’ benefits with 
global-scale efficiency. 
Multi-domestic High/Low Internationalization with locally adapted products 
through process targeted to customers’ needs of the 
host market. 
International Low/Low Reproduction of success achieved in the domestic 
country on the international market. 
                  
 I considered the guidelines of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) to narrow down 
the analysis to the most relevant sectors for China’s expansion. It established seven strategic 
industries in which Chinese corporations are expected to succeed on a global scale. The seven 
industries are: biotechnology, new energy, high-end equipment manufacturing, energy saving 
and environmental protection, clean-energy vehicles, next-generation IT, and new materials. In 
addition, I have considered other relevant industries that stand out from the literature review: 
telecommunications, logistics, food, and textile. Then I positioned all the industries according to 
the underlying IR theory (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987) and determined which sectors are closer to 
the Transnational and Global categories: IT, Telecommunications, Equipment, and Logistics. All 
the other industries have not reached enough maturity in China (i.e. automotive, clean vehicles, 
and textile) or do not have pressure for global integration (i.e. new energy and new materials) to 
move towards the Transnational stage in which multinational companies consider markets as a 
portfolio of local opportunities and adopt a decentralized federation structure as a managerial 
model (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987). The overall framework is illustrated in the figure below. 
After having determined the positioning of the industries on the IR chart,  I have utilized a 
negotiation framework (Thomas, 1976) that considers two factors (importance of the relationship 
and importance of the outcome) to determine the most appropriate conflict resolution strategy 
depending on the combination of their importance (Lewicki, Hiam, & Olander, 1996). Five 
options are defined: Accommodating (“Lose to win”), Collaborative (“Win-Win”), Avoiding 
(“Lose-Lose”), Competitive (“Win-Lose”), and Compromise (“Split the Difference”). The 
importance of the relationship in the Chinese culture is crucial to succeed in business therefore is 
vital to aim to a collaborative solution whenever possible to achieve a mutual satisfactory 
agreement.  
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 To determine the theoretical expected negotiation strategy for EU and China, I have 
assigned scores to the factors that I assume contributing to the outcome and relationship’s 
importance for both parties. Chinese outcome’s weight is determined by the average of the 
priorities established by the government (high/low) and the IR positioning. The score of the 
relationship’s importance is determined by the mode of entry, considering JV as the less 
aggressive and M&A the more competitive one. On EU side the outcome’s importance is linked  
 
                                 Figure 2 – IR model and industries positioning 
 
 
 
 
      Figure 3 – Conflict Resolution Strategies (Lewicki, Hiam, & Olander, 1996).  
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to the strategic relevance of the sector (high/medium/low) while the relationship’s importance is 
related to long term benefits due to the Chinese presence (high/medium/low). The detailed 
scoring system is illustrated in the table below. 
      
                                        Table 2 – Scoring system 
 
 
 
 Then I matched industries and strategies for both China and EU identifying 
misalignments and their magnitude utilizing the L.I.S.A. score, calculated with the following 
formula: 
                  L.I.S.A. score = 100 – DISTANCE – PENALTY 
 
DISTANCE is the geometrical distance between EU’s and China’s position in the 
strategies chart calculated with the Pythagorean Theorem as follows: 
SQRT [(China outcome – EU outcome) 2 + (China relationship – EU relationship) 2] 
PENALTY is equal to 0 if both EU and China follow a Collaborative strategy, 25 (half 
quadrant “length”) if one of them chooses a Competitive option while the other one uses a 
Collaborative strategy, and 50 if both parties utilize a Competitive approach. The total score can 
range between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 100. The score is not calculated if one of the 
parties has an expected Avoiding or Accommodating strategy and the value N/A is assigned. The 
overall results and the detailed scores are illustrated in the table below. 
  
Status Score
Priority for High 10
Chinese Gov't Low 4
IR Strategy Transnational 10
Global 7
International 4
Multi-domestic 1
Mode of entry JV 10
Greenfield 7
Acquisition 1
Strategic Sector High 10
Medium 7
Low 1
Benfit from High 10
Cooperation Medium 7
(long term) Low 1
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China’s Future Investment in EU: When a Collaborative Win-Win Approach is possible?  
 Even if different weights determine slightly different figures, the results of the analysis 
show that some industries are suitable candidates for a mutual satisfactory relationship. 
Logistics, New Energy, Equipment made through JV or greenfield projects are the leaders of a 
virtual ranking along with Energy Savings executed through any mode of entry. 
Biotechnology and Telecom through a JV or greenfield investment and IT through 
acquisition are the more problematic situations. EU safety and strategic concerns along with a 
more competitive Chinese approach due to the scarcity of resources (e.g. lower number of 
suitable targets) can be the root cause of this outcome. 
 The DISTANCE parameter provides interesting information, also for industries not 
covered by the L.I.S.A. score. In some cases (e.g. JV and acquisition in Food) it seems easier to 
establish collaborative partnerships while other scenarios (e.g. JV in Clean Vehicles and New 
Materials, and acquisitions in Automotive) prefigure conflict issues. 
 To reduce distant positions Chinese companies should adopt standards of corporate 
governance and social responsibility that are compatible with Europe’s economic interests. In my 
opinion, EU should implement an investment review system and a screening institution 
comparable to the US Committee on Foreign Investment. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 The Chinese goal to make a transition from “Made in China” to “Designed in China” a 
business model, along with economic and political motives, is supporting Chinese FDI 
worldwide. 
 Even if they are growing, Chinese companies’ investments in Europe are still a small 
share of the total China’s FDI. Furthermore, only few acquisitions can be considered successful, 
either from a profit and value standpoint or a strategic perspective. Successful takeovers resulted 
from the two partners developing synergies and Chinese investors contributing to enhance 
competitiveness in specific markets or industries instead of just funding the acquired company. 
 I developed the L.I.S.A. scoring system to help both European and Chinese players 
identify and plan potential developments of the evolution of the China’s footprint in Europe 
together with Chinese partners. The tool can also be useful to anticipate area of conflicts due to 
different negotiation approaches and strategic goals. 
 In fact, the mutual understanding of the importance of the guanxi4, and the need for 
strategic and national security along with a more collaborative approach, when possible, would 
result in a greater number of successful agreements and long term business partnership. 
 The Logistics, New Energy, Equipment, and Energy Saving sectors are the most suitable 
candidates to develop a collaborative strategic partnership. Conversely, Biotechnology, IT, and 
Telecom appear to be the most problematic industries. Further analysis is necessary to fine tune 
weights of parameters, and check the reliability of the model on a large scale while extending it 
                                                      
4 The relationship in the Chinese business world 
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to other industries and negotiation styles combinations. 
 Finally, there is definitely a need of a more cohesive approach to better explore and 
analyze Chinese investment in EU. I believe that European countries should cooperate to 
improve statistical reporting and European scholars should collaborate more closely in sharing 
their researches’ results. Representative of both governmental agencies and businesses should 
also be involved in the studies. The ultimate goal should be a focus on areas which are important 
both for businesses and the scientific public. An exchange of ideas and closer collaboration 
would help all the stakeholders to better understand complex situations and evolving scenarios. 
Without a doubt, disseminating this information would ease the formation process of successful 
and mutually beneficiary strategic partnerships between Chinese and European players.  
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